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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION
CYNTHIA HEATHERLY
Plaintiff Case No. 11 C 8480
v. Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
PORTILLO'S HOT DOGS, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc.'s 
(hereinafter, "Portillo's" or "Defendant") Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Strike. For the reasons stated herein, 
the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike and grants the 
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Portillo's operates thirty-two (32) fast-food restaurants in 
the Chicagoland area. It employed Plaintiff Cynthia Heatherly 
(hereinafter, "Heathery" or "Plaintiff") from January 2009 to 
June 2010 as a Guest Services employee. Heatherly's duties 
included greeting customers, handing food to customers, reading 
food orders, placing the correct items in bags, cooking french 
fries, and making drinks. In November 2009, she was transferred 
to a drive-through Guest Services position. This position 
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orders, double-check bagged orders to ensure accuracy, and 
deliver bags through the drive-through window or to an outside 
runner. The new position also required Heatherly to work outside 
periodically as an "outside runner." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s 
Statement of Undisputed Facts at 3. Outside runners are 
responsible for taking food orders outside near the drive-through 
window and walking outside to deliver food orders to the cars 
waiting in the drive-through line. Id.
In September 2009, Heatherly discovered she was pregnant. 
In January 2010, she presented a doctor's note to her Assistant 
Manager which stated that she was only to perform light duties 
and was "not to work more than 8 hour shifts." Pl.'s 56.1 
Statements of Material Fact; Ex. E., ECF No. 37-5, Page ID# 885. 
On February 16, 2010, Heatherly's doctor advised her to take 
leave from work because of complications related to her 
pregnancy. Pursuant to these instructions, Heatherly notified 
Portillo's and went on FMLA leave from the said date until her 
child was born.
On May 11, 2010 (the day after her child was born), 
Heatherly called Portillo's and spoke with Deanna Wilson 
("Wilson"), the assistant to Portillo's Benefits Manager. During 
the call, Wilson told Heatherly that her 12 weeks of FMLA time 
had expired, but that she could have three additional weeks of 
personal leave pursuant to Portillo's policy. Allegedly, Wilson
2
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informed Heatherly that her personal time would expire on June 3, 
2010 and she needed to return to work on that date.
Two days after the telephone call, Portillo's sent Heatherly 
a letter summarizing the conversation and reiterating that 
Heatherly had to return to work by June 3, 2010. However, June 3 
came and went without Heatherly reporting to work or otherwise 
contacting Portillo's.
As a result, on June 8, 2010, Portillo's sent Heatherly a 
letter terminating her employment. The letter stated that 
Heatherly could be rehired after her doctor cleared her to return 
to work, and stated that she could contact Portillo's Benefits 
Manager with any questions.
Heatherly never contacted Portillo's. Instead, she filed a 
charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human 
Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the 
"EEOC") on October 19, 2010. After receiving her Right to Sue 
letter, she filed a Complaint in this Court. In her Complaint, 
she asserts Portillo's is liable for sex discrimination in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count I), and disability 
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (Count II). 
Portillo's has moved for summary judgment on both counts.
3
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Portillo's Motion to Strike
Before turning to the merits of the summary judgment motion, 
the Court addresses briefly Portillo's Motion to Strike. 
Plaintiff filed her initial response to Portillo's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on February 8, 2013. See ECF No. 29. On
February 19, 2013, Portillo's filed its Reply and pointed out a 
number of deficiencies in Plaintiff's response, including the 
fact that Heatherly failed to abide by Local Rule 56.1. Shortly 
after the Reply was filed, the parties conferred over telephone. 
At this time, Heatherly asked Portillo's counsel if he would 
agree to allow her to file a corrected response. Allegedly, 
Heatherly represented that the second response would only correct 
typographical errors in an attempt to abide by Rule 56.1. Based 
on these representations, Portillo's agreed to allow her re-file 
her response and on February 22, 2013, Heatherly filed a 
"Corrected Response" and a "Corrected Rule 56.1 Statement." See 
ECF Nos. 34-37.
After reviewing the documents and discovering that Heatherly 
changed substantial portions of her Response Memorandum, Response 
to Portillo's 56.1 Statements of Material Fact, and her 
Statements of Additional Facts, Portillo's filed a Motion to 
Strike. In the Motion, Portillo's argues that the Court should 
strike the corrected response because of Heatherly's
4
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misrepresentations and because the substantive changes in the 
corrected response have transformed it into a Surreply since 
Heatherly had the benefit of reviewing Portillo's Reply prior to 
filing the corrected response.
While the Court agrees that there are a number of changes in 
the corrected response that are improper and untimely, the Court 
finds such changes immaterial to the ultimate disposition of 
Portillo's Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, the Court 
denies Portillo's Motion to Strike as moot.
B. Portillo's Motion for Summary Judgment
Portillo's moves for summary judgment on Heatherly's Title 
VII sex discrimination claim and her Americans with Disabilities 
Act Amendments Act ("ADAAA") claims. Portillo's contends 
Heatherly cannot establish a prima facie case for any of the 
claims. The Court agrees.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party "shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence would permit a 
reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is 
material if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. If the 
moving party satisfies its burden, the non-movant must present 
facts to show a genuine dispute exists to avoid summary judgment.
5
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See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). To 
establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do 
more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as the 
material facts." Sarver v. Experian Info. Sys., 390 F.3d 969, 
970 (7th Cir. 2004).
1. Count I: Sex Discrimination under Title VII
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis 
of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a). Heatherly's sex 
discrimination claim is governed by the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, an Amendment to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); see also, 
Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286 n.19 
(1986) (discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes sex 
discrimination).
"The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to 
prohibit employment discrimination because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." Hitchcock 
v. Angel Corps, Inc., No. 12-3515, 2013 WL 2507243 at *3 (7th 
Cir. June 11, 2013) (citations omitted). There are two ways a 
plaintiff can prove such a claim: the direct method of proof or 
the indirect method of proof. Id. Under the direct method, a 
plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence that the 
employer had a discriminatory motivation. Under the indirect, 
burden-shifting method, a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements
6
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of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 7 92 (1973) to 
survive summary judgment. Id. Heatherly proceeds under the 
indirect method.
"The indirect method requires a plaintiff to first establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination." Serednyj v. Beverly 
Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 550 (7th Cir. 2011). For the 
purposes of Heatherly's pregnancy discrimination claim, she must 
establish that: (1) she was pregnant and her employer knew she 
was pregnant; (2) she was performing her job duties 
satisfactorily; (3) she was terminated; and (4) similarly 
situated, non-pregnant employees were treated more favorably. 
Id. After a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination. Id. 
Assuming such a reason is advanced, a plaintiff can survive 
summary judgment only if she shows that the employer's provided 
reason is a mere pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. 
citing Griffin v. Sisters of Saint Francis, Inc., 489 F.3d 838, 
843 (7th Cir. 2007).
The first element of Heatherly's prima facie discrimination 
case is not in dispute. Heatherly was pregnant and Portillo's 
acknowledges that it was aware of her condition. See Def.'s Mem.
7
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in Supp. of Summ. J. at 23. The remaining elements, however, 
must be established for Heatherly to survive summary judgment.
First, Heatherly must establish that she was performing her 
job duties satisfactorily. Heatherly contends she can do so 
because her job performance prior to taking leave was 
satisfactory. While Portillo's agrees about the quality of 
Heatherly's job performance prior to her taking leave, it claims 
this is evidence irrelevant because such evidence relates to 
Heatherly's past job performance and not her performance "at the 
time of her termination." Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 
680, 689 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court agrees.
Heatherly was terminated on June 8, 2010. It is undisputed 
that on May 13, 2010 Portillo's sent her a letter informing her 
that she needed to return to work by June 3, 2010. Despite this 
notification, Heatherly failed to report to work or contact 
anyone from Portillo's. This inaction is a violation of 
Portillo's attendance policy. See ECF No. 24-1, Page ID# 122 
(requiring an employee to notify a manager at least four hours in 
advance of their scheduled start time if they are unable to work 
when scheduled). Based on the above, Heatherly cannot establish 
that at the time of her termination she was meeting Portillo's 
job expectations. See Martino v. California Fed. Bank, No. 00-C- 
370, 2001 WL 1465140 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2001) (finding that 
a plaintiff could not establish satisfactory work performance at
8
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the time of termination because she failed to return to work 
after her leave expired).
The Court rejects Heatherly's claims that she was unaware 
she had to return to work by June 3, 2010. The Court finds her 
admission that she received the letter Portillo's on May 13, 
2010, that stated she "need[ed] to return to work by June 3, 
2010 . . ." fatal to her claims regarding lack of knowledge. 
Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts; Ex. B, ECF 
No. 24-3, Page ID# 302; see also, Pl.'s Corrected Resp. to Def.'s 
Statement of Fact at 18. Accordingly, Heatherly cannot establish 
a prima facie case of sex discrimination and Portillo's is 
entitled to summary judgment on Heatherly's gender discrimination 
claim.
2. Count II: Disability Discrimination and 
Failure to Accommodate
There are two types of claims a plaintiff can assert under 
the ADAAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (discrimination on the basis of 
disability); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (failure to accommodate). 
Heatherly purports to assert both a disability discrimination 
claim and a failure to accommodate claim in Count II.
a. Disability Discrimination
Heatherly claims Portillo's discriminated against her on the 
basis of her disability when it terminated her employment. 
Similar to Title VII, a plaintiff alleging disability
9
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discrimination can prove their case under either the direct or 
indirect method. See Dickerson v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. 
Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011). Under the 
direct method, plaintiffs must present either direct or 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination to meet their burden. 
Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2004). 
Under the indirect method, a plaintiff must first establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination and show that: (1) she is 
disabled under the ADAAA; (2) she is qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the job, either with or without reasonable 
accommodations; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment 
action. Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838-39 (7th Cir. 
2012). After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts back to the employer to provide a non­
discriminatory reason for the employment action. If the employer 
does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish 
that the employer's articulated reason is a pretext for 
intentional discrimination. Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 
905 (7th Cir. 2002)
At the outset, the Court notes Heatherly's allegations 
surrounding her disability discrimination claim are sparse at 
best. She devotes much of her response to arguing that 
Portillo's failed to provide her reasonable accommodations under 
the ADAAA. However, because she states "Portillo's
10
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justifications were pretextual," the Court assumes she seeks to 
proceed under the indirect method with respect to her disability 
discrimination claim. Def.'s Corrected Resp. at 12.
Portillo's argues Heatherly cannot establish a prima facie 
case because her condition does not qualify as a disability under 
the ADAAA and because she did not suffer an adverse employment 
action since she was eligible to be rehired. Heatherly claims 
her high risk pregnancy renders her disabled and claims 
Portillo's terminated because of this disability.
Even if the Court were to assume that Heatherly can 
establish a prima facie case (which is a stretch), the only 
attempt Heatherly makes to rebut Portillo's proffered reason for 
termination is her assertion that Portillo's "justifications were 
pretextual." Pl.'s Corrected Mem. of Law of Opp. to Def.'s Mot. 
for Summ. J. at 12. Without more, this assertion is insufficient 
for the Court to conclude that a triable issue exists with 
respect to pretext. See Garr v. Union Pac. R.R., 10 C 5407, 2013 
WL 68699 at *10 (N.D. 1ll. Jan. 4, 2013) ("in the absence of 
direct evidence, a plaintiff may show pretext by presenting 
evidence tending to prove that the employer's proffered reasons 
are factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the 
discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the 
[adverse employment action].") (citations omitted). As further 
support, the Court has already pointed out that Heatherly admits
11
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Portillo's sent her a letter on May 13, 2010 stating that she
needed to return to work by June 3, 2010. Pl.'s Corrected
Response to Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statements 5 62. She also admits 
she failed to report to work on June 3, 2010 and failed to ever 
contact Portillo's. Id. 5 63. This was a violation of
Portillo's attendance policy and Portillo's proffered reason for 
terminating Heatherly's employment. Heatherly has not presented 
any evidence to suggest that this reason was pretextual or a 
guise for intentional discrimination. Accordingly, the Court 
grants Portillo's summary judgment on Heatherly's disability 
discrimination claim.
b. Failure to Accommodate
Heatherly also claims Portillo's violated the ADAAA by 
failing to provide her reasonable accommodations. To establish 
a failure to accommodate claim under the ADAAA, a plaintiff must 
show that: "(1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; 
(2) the employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the 
employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability." Cloe 
v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2013).
i. Qualified Disabilities Under the ADAAA 
Heatherly's claimed disability is her high-risk pregnancy 
and/or the complications she suffered related to her pregnancy. 
She argues that this condition rendered her disabled under the 
ADAAA. Specifically, she argues that the recent amendments to
12
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the ADAAA support this conclusion because the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (the "ADAAA") relaxed the 
duration and severity requirements for qualified disabilities.
To establish that a plaintiff is "disabled" under the ADAAA, 
the plaintiff must either: "(a) have a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities . . .; (b) have a record of such an impairment; or (c) 
be regarded as having such an impairment. Travis v. Cook-DuPage 
Transp., No. 11-C-6080, 2012 WL 1284022 at *7 (N.D. 1ll. Apr. 16, 
2012) citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). Determining whether an 
individual has a qualifying disability under the ADAAA is an 
individualized inquiry. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
Heatherly claims she suffered a physical impairment that 
rendered her disabled because she was placed on light duty 
restrictions due to her high risk pregnancy. She claims her 
inability to work in excess of 6-8 hours and her inability to 
lift heavy objects constitute limitations on major life 
activities under the ADAAA.
Portillo's contends these restrictions do not "substantially 
limit" Heatherly's "major life activities" because these 
restrictions were only temporary. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). 
However, as Heatherly points out, the regulations of the ADAAA 
provide that "[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected
13
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to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting 
within the meaning of this section." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix) 
(2011). In light of this, the Court declines to accept 
Portillo's argument that the short duration of Heatherly's 
limitations prevents her from being considered disabled under the 
ADAAA.
Additionally, while Portillo's claims that Heatherly's 
restrictions did not impact "major life activities," the ADAAA 
defines "lifting" as a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1), (2). Heatherly's nurse testified that the 
January 19, 2010 medical note that stated Heatherly should only 
engage in "light duty" meant that Heatherly should refrain from 
"heavy lifting." Def.'s 56.1 Statement, Ex. E at 19, ECF No. 24­
6, Page ID# 344. Because of this, the Court finds Heatherly has 
presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact 
as to whether her high risk pregnancy rendered her disabled under 
the ADAAA.
ii. Employer's Knowledge of Disability
The second element a plaintiff must establish to set forth 
a failure to accommodate claim is that the employer was aware of 
the plaintiff's disability. Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., Inc., 
637 F.3d 744, 747-48 (7th Cir. 2011). The Seventh Circuit has 
held that it is the responsibility of the employee to inform her
14
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employer of the disability at issue. See generally, Beck v. 
Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1996).
Portillo's does not dispute that Heatherly presented a 
doctor's note dated January 19, 2010, which stated "[f]or light 
duty. Not to work more than 8 hour shifts." Def.'s Mem. In 
Supp. of Summ. J. at 14-15; see also ECF No. 37-5, Page ID# 885. 
However, Portillo's avers that Heatherly never presented a 
medical note which stated that she should refrain from working 
outside. In fact, Heatherly admits that she never "gave 
Portillo's any documentation that specifically said . . . [she]
couldn't work outside . . ." Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statements, Ex. B, 
Heatherly Dep. at 76; ECF No. 24-2, Page ID# 223. Given these 
facts, the Court finds Heatherly has established that Portillo's 
was only aware that Heatherly was required to engage in light 
duties and was to refrain from working longer than 8 hour shifts.
iii. Failure to Accommodate
The final prong Heatherly must establish to sustain a claim 
is that Portillo's failed to reasonably accommodate her 
disability. Kotwica, 637 F.3d at 747-48. With respect to this 
prong, the Seventh Circuit instructs that the parties must 
"engage in an interactive process to determine a reasonable 
accommodation." EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 
(7th Cir. 2005). Indeed, recent case law provides that the
15
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interactive process should consist of a give and take between the
employer and the employee. For example:
[a]n employer can take no solace in its 
failure to engage in this process in good 
faith if what results is an unreasonable or 
inappropriate accommodation offer. And an 
employee who fails to uphold her end of the 
bargain-for example, by not clarifying the 
extent of her medical restrictions-cannot 
impose liability on the employer for its 
failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation.
Hoppe v. Lewis University, 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Heatherly claims she attempted to engage in an interactive 
process with Portillo's on January 19, 2010 when she presented 
Portillo's with her medical note. While she argues she can 
establish a failure to accommodate because Portillo's caused a 
break down in the interactive process, this argument flies in the 
face of her admission that she never worked more than 4.72 
consecutive hours without a break, and never worked more than 
7.52 total hours in a single day after January 1, 2010 through 
February 15, 2010 (her last day of work). Pl.'s Corrected Resp. 
to Def.'s 56.1 Statements of Fact at 5 24.
Notwithstanding this admission, Heatherly contends 
Portillo's failed to accommodate her by forcing her to work 
outside periodically. She seems to argue that working outside 
violated her doctor's orders of "light duty." However, Heatherly
16
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admits that she never provided Portillo's any documentation that 
stated she could not work outside. Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statements, 
Ex. B, Heatherly Dep. at 76; ECF No. 24-2, Page ID# 223. 
Instead, she testified that she informed her superiors that she 
did not want to work outside, and despite these requests she was 
forced to do so periodically. It is well established that an 
employer only has to provide "a reasonable accommodation, not the 
accommodation [the employee] would prefer." Hoppe, 692 F.3d at 
840; see also, Torres v. Bremen Castings, Inc., 3:11-CV-035, 2012 
WL 4498876 at *9 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2012). As added support, 
the record is replete with evidence that suggests Heatherly's 
condition did not affect her ability to work outside. Her 
treating physician testified that there was nothing about her 
condition that would have prevented her being outside. Def.'s 
56.1 Statement, Ex. F, Senica Dep. at 26, ECF No. 24-7, Page ID# 
366. Her nurse testified that she never told Heatherly she could 
not be outside and she did not "see why . . . [it] would be an 
issue" for Heatherly to "occasionally deliver food to cars." Id. 
Ex. E, O'Brien Dep. at 31-32, ECF No. 24-6, Page ID# 352-353. In 
light of this, the Court cannot conclude that Portillo's failed 
to accommodate Heatherly.
Finally, the Court rejects the arguments that Portillo's is 
liable because it never asked Heatherly for a medical note 
stating that she should refrain from working outside. It is the
17
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responsibility of the employee to make an employer aware of the 
work limitations surrounding a disability. See Torres v. Bremen 
Castings, Inc., 3:11-CV-035, 2012 WL 4498876 at *8 (N.D. Ind.
Sept. 28, 2012) (stating that the Seventh Circuit requires
plaintiffs to inform employers of the disability at issue in a 
failure to accommodate claim); see also, Hoppe, 692 F.3d at 840 
(upholding summary judgment for a defendant employer because the 
employee failed to present a medical note with sufficient details 
about what steps were necessary to reasonably accommodate an 
employee's disability). Accordingly, the Court finds that 
Heatherly cannot establish that Portillo's failed to provide 
reasonable accommodations under the ADAAA and grants summary 
judgment to Portillo's with respect to Count II.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant's Motion to 
Strike [ECF No. 38] is denied, and the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 22] is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Court
Date: July 19, 2013
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